ArticleHeliyon2023
Towards a green mining future: A dynamic evolutionary game model for collaborative waste recycling.
Article in Heliyon, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
In the realm of environmental concerns, the management of mining waste has consistently emerged as a prominent issue. The accumulation of such waste not only results in substantial pollution but also signifies an inefficient use of resources. Rich in heavy metals and an array of toxic substances, mining waste poses a considerable challenge. In China, the situation is exacerbated by mining companies' inadequate and untimely efforts to address the extensive buildup of waste material. The long-term policy of recycling and regulating mining waste can be seen as the result of a long-term game between the government's regulatory decisions and the enterprises' fulfillment of their responsibilities, and the public's ability to participate in monitoring the decisions also changes the pattern of the game. In this study, we develop a tripartite evolutionary game model involving mining enterprises, the public, and local government. System dynamics are used to simulate the dynamic evolution of each stakeholder's strategy, examining the influence of various parameters on the evolution trajectory. Our findings show that: (1) reducing public subsidies, along with increasing enterprise supervision and penalties, effectively encourages public involvement in oversight and promotes proactive waste recycling by enterprises; (2) as enterprises actively engage in recycling efforts, the resulting environmental benefits boost public enthusiasm for participation in monitoring; (3) over time, heightened environmental awareness among the public and advances in recycling technology allow enterprises to improve the profitability of recycling, fostering a sustainable mine waste recycling industry; (4) once a virtuous mine waste recycling industry is established, enterprises autonomously engage in waste recycling, and the public actively participates in supervision, making strict government oversight unnecessary.
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