Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37809292›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychology2023

Intuitive thinking predicts false memory formation due to a decrease in inhibitory efficiency.

Giorgio Gronchi, Stefania Righi, Gioele Gavazzi, Fiorenza Giganti, Maria Pia Viggiano

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact, top 85% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 0 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Giorgio GronchiPsychology Section, Department of Neuroscience, Psychology, Drug Research and Child's Health, University of Florence, Florence, Italy.
Stefania RighiPsychology Section, Department of Neuroscience, Psychology, Drug Research and Child's Health, University of Florence, Florence, Italy.
Gioele GavazziPsychology Section, Department of Neuroscience, Psychology, Drug Research and Child's Health, University of Florence, Florence, Italy.
Fiorenza GigantiPsychology Section, Department of Neuroscience, Psychology, Drug Research and Child's Health, University of Florence, Florence, Italy.
Maria Pia ViggianoPsychology Section, Department of Neuroscience, Psychology, Drug Research and Child's Health, University of Florence, Florence, Italy.
University of Florence · IT

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

False memory formation is usually studied using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM), in which individuals incorrectly remember words that were not originally presented. In this paper, we systematically investigated how two modes of thinking (analytical vs. intuitive) can influence the tendency to create false memories. The increased propensity of intuitive thinkers to generate more false memories can be explained by one or both of the following hypotheses: a decrease in the inhibition of the lure words that come to mind, or an increased reliance on the familiarity heuristic to determine if the word has been previously studied. In two studies, we conducted tests of both recognition and recall using the DRM paradigm. Our observations indicate that a decrease in inhibitory efficiency plays a larger role in false memory formation compared to the use of the familiarity heuristic.

Indexed as

cognitive reflectionCRTDRMdual process theory of thoughtfalse memoriesinhibitionreasoning

Identifiers

PMID37809292
PMCPMC10556870
OpenAlexW4386957530

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.