Disaster response strategies of governments and social organizations: From the perspective of infrastructure damage and asymmetric resource dependence.

Natural disaster response is commonly regarded as a dynamic process that reflects intricate relationships between physical and social factors. The resilience of physical infrastructure impacts the availability of emergency resources, while asymmetric resource dependence among emergency cooperation organizations influences the effectiveness of the coordinated emergency response. This study has formulated differential game encompassing three emergency response models: autonomous participation, government-led, and collaborative response. These models have been designed to account for scenarios involving infrastructure damage and asymmetric resource dependence scenarios to compute the optimal level of emergency response efforts by both government and social organizations, the government cost-sharing ratio, the optimal level of emergency resource availability, and disaster response performance. The results indicated that, under specific conditions, government cost-sharing can motivate social organizations to actively engage in disaster response, leading to improvement in disaster response performance. The collaborative emergency response model outperformed the other models regarding optimal emergency response strategy and disaster response performance. Notably, infrastructure damage and asymmetric resource dependence lead to a reduction in the optimal level of emergency response efforts and system disaster response performance for both parties. Furthermore, the impact of infrastructure damage on disaster response performance and the optimization of emergency resource availability levels are shown to be more substantial than the effects of asymmetric resource dependence. This research provided theoretical support for strategic decision-making in natural disaster response and is more aligned with disaster response.