ArticleMedicine, health care, and philosophy2023
First-person disavowals of digital phenotyping and epistemic injustice in psychiatry.
Article in Medicine, health care, and philosophy, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
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Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Rethinking Ethics for an Era of Trusted Computational Tools.The Psychiatric clinics of North America · 2026Review
- Ethical challenges in contemporary psychiatry: an overview and an appraisal of possible strategies and research needs.World psychiatry : official journal of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) · 2024Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person's digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients' testimony and treatment preferences, which can be instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry.
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