Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37687988›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2023

A Security Framework for Increasing Data and Device Integrity in Internet of Things Systems.

Amir Dirin, Ian Oliver, Teemu H Laine

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Amir DirinDepartment of ICT, Metropolia University of Applied Sciences, 00920 Helsinki, Finland.ORCID 0000-0002-4851-5711
Ian OliverNokia Bell Labs, 02610 Espoo, Finland.
Teemu H LaineDepartment of Digital Media, Ajou University, Suwon 16499, Republic of Korea.ORCID 0000-0001-5966-992X

Funding

Ministry of Science and ICT, Korea IITP-2021-0-02051
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The trustworthiness of a system is not just about proving the identity or integrity of the hardware but also extends to the data, control, and management planes of communication between devices and the software they are running. This trust in data and device integrity is desirable for Internet of Things (IoT) systems, especially in critical environments. In this study, we developed a security framework, IoTAttest, for building IoT systems that leverage the Trusted Platform Module 2.0 and remote attestation technologies to enable the establishment of IoT devices' collected data and control plan traffic integrity. After presenting the features and reference architecture of IoTAttest, we evaluated the privacy preservation and validity through the implementation of two proof-of-concept IoT applications that were designed by two teams of university students based on the reference architecture. After the development, the developers answered open questions regarding their experience and perceptions of the framework's usability, limitations, scalability, extensibility, potential, and security. The results indicate that IoTAttest can be used to develop IoT systems with effective attestation to achieve device and data integrity. The proof-of-concept solutions' outcomes illustrate the functionalities and performance of the IoT framework. The feedback from the proof-of-concept developers affirms that they perceived the framework as usable, scalable, extensible, and secure.

Indexed as

data integritydevice integrityframeworkInternet of Thingsproof-of-conceptsecurity

Identifiers

PMID37687988
PMCPMC10490583

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.