Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37651182›Full record

ReviewJMIR public health and surveillance2023

Reported Global Avian Influenza Detections Among Humans and Animals During 2013-2022: Comprehensive Review and Analysis of Available Surveillance Data.

Christine M Szablewski, Chelsea Iwamoto, Sonja J Olsen, Carolyn M Greene, Lindsey M Duca, C Todd Davis, Kira C Coggeshall, William W Davis, Gideon O Emukule, Philip L Gould and 5 more

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in JMIR public health and surveillance, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 22 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
22citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

22 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Deliberating the scientific evidence base for influenza transmission to raw milk consumers.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2025
    Review
  8. Article
  9. Review
  10. Review
  11. Article
  12. Preparedness, prevention and control related to zoonotic avian influenza.EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority · 2025
    Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Review
  16. Article
  17. Review
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

15 authors.

Christine M SzablewskiInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0003-4796-7318
Chelsea IwamotoInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0003-1117-0198
Sonja J OlsenInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-8983-1913
Carolyn M GreeneInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-9342-1431
Lindsey M DucaInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0003-2998-646X
C Todd DavisInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-1429-974X
Kira C CoggeshallDivision of Global Health Protection, Global Health Center, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-3368-6366
William W DavisInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0001-7062-9531
Gideon O EmukuleInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0001-6581-242X
Philip L GouldInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-7269-4318
Alicia M FryInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-3208-9308
David E WentworthInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-5190-980X
Vivien G DuganInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0003-3738-7141
James C KileInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0001-6240-2871
Eduardo Azziz-BaumgartnerInfluenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.ORCID 0000-0002-0298-5814

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundAvian influenza (AI) virus detections occurred frequently in 2022 and continue to pose a health, economic, and food security risk. The most recent global analysis of official reports of animal outbreaks and human infections with all reportable AI viruses was published almost a decade ago. Increased or renewed reports of AI viruses, especially high pathogenicity H5N8 and H5N1 in birds and H5N1, H5N8, and H5N6 in humans globally, have established the need for a comprehensive review of current global AI virus surveillance data to assess the pandemic risk of AI viruses.

objectiveThis study aims to provide an analysis of global AI animal outbreak and human case surveillance information from the last decade by describing the circulating virus subtypes, regions and temporal trends in reporting, and country characteristics associated with AI virus outbreak reporting in animals; surveillance and reporting gaps for animals and humans are identified.

methodsWe analyzed AI virus infection reports among animals and humans submitted to animal and public health authorities from January 2013 to June 2022 and compared them with reports from January 2005 to December 2012. A multivariable regression analysis was used to evaluate associations between variables of interest and reported AI virus animal outbreaks.

resultsFrom 2013 to 2022, 52.2% (95/182) of World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Member Countries identified 34 AI virus subtypes during 21,249 outbreaks. The most frequently reported subtypes were high pathogenicity AI H5N1 (10,079/21,249, 47.43%) and H5N8 (6722/21,249, 31.63%). A total of 10 high pathogenicity AI and 6 low pathogenicity AI virus subtypes were reported to the WOAH for the first time during 2013-2022. AI outbreaks in animals occurred in 26 more Member Countries than reported in the previous 8 years. Decreasing World Bank income classification was significantly associated with decreases in reported AI outbreaks (P<.001-.02). Between January 2013 and June 2022, 17/194 (8.8%) World Health Organization (WHO) Member States reported 2000 human AI virus infections of 10 virus subtypes. H7N9 (1568/2000, 78.40%) and H5N1 (254/2000, 12.70%) viruses accounted for the most human infections. As many as 8 of these 17 Member States did not report a human case prior to 2013. Of 1953 human cases with available information, 74.81% (n=1461) had a known animal exposure before onset of illness. The median time from illness onset to the notification posted on the WHO event information site was 15 days (IQR 9-30 days; mean 24 days). Seasonality patterns of animal outbreaks and human infections with AI viruses were very similar, occurred year-round, and peaked during November through May.

conclusionsOur analysis suggests that AI outbreaks are more frequently reported and geographically widespread than in the past. Global surveillance gaps include inconsistent reporting from all regions and human infection reporting delays. Continued monitoring for AI virus outbreaks in animals and human infections with AI viruses is crucial for pandemic preparedness.

Indexed as

Influenza A Virus, H5N1 SubtypeInfluenza A Virus, H7N9 SubtypeInfluenza in BirdsAnimalsDisease OutbreaksHumansPandemicsavian influenzanovel influenzaOne Healthpandemic influenzasurveillancezoonotic influenza

Identifiers

PMID37651182
PMCPMC10502594

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.