Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37588410›Full record

ReviewEvolutionary human sciences2019

Punishment: one tool, many uses.

Nichola J Raihani, Redouan Bshary

Erratum issuedOpen access · goldAbstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Evolutionary human sciences, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 43 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
43citing papers in PubMed
16.3field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

43 citing papers in PubMed, 130 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
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  8. Profitable third-party punishment destabilizes cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
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  9. What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
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  12. A norm about harvest division is maintained by a desire to follow tradition, not by social policing.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.

Nichola J RaihaniDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2339-9889
Redouan BsharyInstitut de Biologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Rue Emilie-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, Switzerland.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7198-8472
University College London · GBUniversity of Neuchâtel · CH

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment - paying a cost to harm others - is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.

Indexed as

Competitioncooperationfairnesspunishmentspite

Identifiers

PMID37588410
PMCPMC10427336
OpenAlexW2987925962

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.