Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37462180›Full record

ArticleThe Behavioral and brain sciences2023

Unifying theories of reasoning and decision making.

Brett K Hayes, Rachel G Stephens, John C Dunn

Abstract readComment
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In one paragraph

Article in The Behavioral and brain sciences, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Brett K HayesUniversity of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia b.hayes@unsw.edu.auhttps://www.unsw.edu.au/staff/brett-hayes.
Rachel G StephensUniversity of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia rachel.stephens@adelaide.edu.au.
John C DunnUniversity of Western Australia, Perth, Australia john.dunn@uwa.edu.au.ORCID 0000-0002-3950-3460

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

De Neys offers a welcome departure from the dual-process accounts that have dominated theorizing about reasoning. However, we see little justification for retaining the distinction between intuition and deliberation. Instead, reasoning can be treated as a case of multiple-cue decision making. Reasoning phenomena can then be explained by decision-making models that supply the processing details missing from De Neys's framework.

Indexed as

IntuitionProblem SolvingDecision MakingHumans

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.