Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37438579›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2023

Zero-determinant strategy in stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game.

Zhaoyang Cheng, Guanpu Chen, Yiguang Hong

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
2.3field-weighted citation impact, top 11% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed, 9 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. On the optimal integration of intelligent agents into network systems to steer cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.

Zhaoyang ChengKey Laboratory of Systems and Control, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Beijing, 100190, China.
Guanpu ChenSchool of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 11428, Stockholm, Sweden. guanpu@kth.se.
Yiguang HongDepartment of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, 201804, China.
Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science · CNKTH Royal Institute of Technology · SETongji University · CN

Funding

National Key Research and Development Program of China 2022YFA1004700National Natural Science Foundation of China 62173250Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Major Project 2021SHZDZX0100
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the attacker may be a boundedly rational player, who adopts a combination of the BR strategy and a fixed stubborn one. In such a condition, the SSE strategy may not maintain the defensive performance due to the stubbornness. In this paper, we focus on how the defender can adopt the unilateral-control zero-determinate (ZD) strategy to confront the boundedly rational attacker. At first, we verify the existence of ZD strategies for the defender. We then investigate the performance of the defender's ZD strategy against a boundedly rational attacker, with a comparison of the SSE strategy. Specifically, when the attacker's strategy is close to the BR strategy, the ZD strategy admits a bounded loss for the defender compared with the SSE strategy. Conversely, when the attacker's strategy is close to the stubborn strategy, the ZD strategy can bring higher defensive performance for the defender than the SSE strategy does.

Identifiers

PMID37438579
PMCPMC10338512
OpenAlexW4384024694

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.