Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37438341›Full record

ArticleNature communications2023

The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games.

Maria Kleshnina, Christian Hilbe, Štěpán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Nature communications, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Maria Kleshnina *Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse, France. maria.kleshnina@iast.fr.ORCID 0000-0002-5518-8317
Christian Hilbe *Max Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.ORCID 0000-0001-5116-955X
Štěpán ŠimsaIST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria.ORCID 0000-0001-6687-1210
Krishnendu ChatterjeeIST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria.
Martin A NowakDepartment of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.ORCID 0000-0001-5489-0908

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorMass GatheringsHumans

Identifiers

PMID37438341
PMCPMC10338504

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.