Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37415434›Full record

ArticleOsong public health and research perspectives2023

Results of contact tracing for SARS-CoV-2 Omicron sub-lineages (BA.4, BA.5, BA.2.75) and the household secondary attack risk.

Mi Yu, Sang-Eun Lee, Hye Young Lee, Hye-Jin Kim, Yeong-Jun Song, Jian Jeong, Ae Kyung Park, Il-Hwan Kim, Eun-Jin Kim, Young-Joon Park

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Osong public health and research perspectives, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Mi YuDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Sang-Eun LeeDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Hye Young LeeDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Hye-Jin KimDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Yeong-Jun SongDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Jian JeongDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Ae Kyung ParkDivision of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Bureau of Infectious Diseases Diagnosis Control, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Il-Hwan KimDivision of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Bureau of Infectious Diseases Diagnosis Control, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Eun-Jin KimDivision of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Bureau of Infectious Diseases Diagnosis Control, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.
Young-Joon ParkDivision of Epidemiological Investigation, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThis study aimed to assess the contact tracing outcomes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron sub-lineages BA.4, BA.5, and BA.2.75 within Republic of Korea, and to generate foundational data for responding to future novel variants.

methodsWe conducted investigations and contact tracing for 79 confirmed BA.4 cases, 396 confirmed BA.5 cases, and 152 confirmed BA.2.75 cases. These cases were identified through random sampling of both domestically confirmed and imported cases, with the goal of evaluating the pattern of occurrence and transmissibility.

resultsWe detected 79 instances of Omicron sub-lineage BA.4 across a span of 46 days, 396 instances of Omicron sub-lineage BA.5 in 46 days, and 152 instances of Omicron sub-lineage BA.2.75 over 62 days. One patient with severe illness was confirmed among the BA.5 cases; however, there were no reports of severe illness in the confirmed BA.4 and BA.2.75 cases. The secondary attack risk among household contacts were 19.6% for BA.4, 27.8% for BA.5, and 24.3% for BA.2.75. No statistically significant difference was found between the Omicron sub-lineages.

conclusionBA.2.75 did not demonstrate a higher tendency for transmissibility, disease severity, or secondary attack risk within households when compared to BA.4 and BA.5. We will continue to monitor major SARS-CoV-2 variants, and we plan to enhance the disease control and response systems.

Indexed as

COVID-19EpidemiologyRiskSecondary attack rateVariants

Identifiers

PMID37415434
PMCPMC10522828

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.