Are there disciplinary boundaries in the comparative study of primate cognition?

A view continues to gain momentum that regards investigation of the cognition of great apes in captive settings as affording us a model for human cognitive evolution. Researchers from disciplines such as comparative psychology, anthropology, and even archaeology, seem eager to put their theories to the test by using great apes as their chosen experimental model. Questions addressed currently by comparative psychologists have long been the object of attention by neurophysiologists, psychobiologists and neuroscientists, who, however, often use rodents and monkeys as the species of choice. Whereas comparative psychology has been influenced greatly by ethology, much neuroscience has developed against a background of physiology and medicine. This separation of the intellectual contexts wherein they have arisen and flourished has impeded the development of fluid interaction between comparative psychologists and researchers in the other disciplines. We feel that it would be beneficial for comparative psychologists and neuroscientists to combine research endeavours far more often, in order to address common questions of interest related to cognition. We regard interdisciplinary cross-pollination to be particularly desirable, even if many comparative psychologists lack deep expertise about the workings of the brain, and even if many neuroscientists lack expert knowledge about the behaviour of different species. Furthermore, we believe that anthropology, archaeology, human evolutionary studies, and related disciplines, may well provide us with significant contextual knowledge about the physical and temporal background to the evolution in humans of specific cognitive skills. To that end, we urge researchers to dismantle methodological, conceptual and historical disciplinary boundaries, in order to strengthen cross-disciplinary cooperation in order to broaden and deepen our insights into the cognition of nonhuman and human primates.