Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37384598›Full record

ArticlePLOS global public health2023

Incentivisation practices and their influence on physicians' prescriptions: A qualitative analysis of practice and policy in Pakistan.

Mishal Khan, Afifah Rahman-Shepherd, Muhammad Naveed Noor, Sabeen Sharif, Meherunissa Hamid, Wafa Aftab, Afshan Khurshid Isani, Robyna Irshad Khan, Rumina Hasan, Sadia Shakoor and 1 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLOS global public health, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Trial
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

11 authors.

Mishal KhanDepartment of Global Health, Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8967-1761
Afifah Rahman-ShepherdDepartment of Global Health, Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8845-9275
Muhammad Naveed NoorDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7847-6637
Sabeen SharifDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3848-6443
Meherunissa HamidDepartment of Global Health, Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8569-304X
Wafa AftabDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Afshan Khurshid IsaniDepartment of Health, Government of Sindh, Karachi, Pakistan.
Robyna Irshad KhanDepartment of Anaesthesiology, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Rumina HasanDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Sadia ShakoorDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Sameen SiddiqiDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Focus on profit-generating enterprise in healthcare can create conflicts of interest that adversely impact prescribing and pricing of medicines. Although a global challenge, addressing the impacts on quality of care is particularly difficult in countries where the pharmaceutical industry and physician lobby is strong relative to regulatory institutions. Our study characterises the range of incentives exchanged between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians, and investigates the differences between incentivisation practices and policies in Pakistan. In this mixed methods study, we first thematically analysed semi-structured interviews with 28 purposively selected for-profit primary-care physicians and 13 medical sales representatives from pharmaceutical companies working across Pakistan's largest city, Karachi. We then conducted a content analysis of policies on ethical practice issued by two regulatory bodies responsible in Pakistan, and the World Health Organization. This enabled a systematic comparison of incentivisation practices with what is considered 'prohibitive' or 'permissive' in policy. Our findings demonstrate that incentivisation of physicians to meet pharmaceutical sales targets is the norm, and that both parties play in the symbiotic physician-pharma incentivisation dynamics. Further, we were able to categorise the types of incentive exchanged into one of five categories: financial, material, professional or educational, social or recreational, and familial. Our comparison of incentivisation practices with policies revealed three reasons for such widespread incentivisation linked to sales targets: first, some clear policies were being ignored by physicians; second, there are ambiguous or contradictory policies with respect to specific incentive types; and third, numerous incentive types are unaddressed by existing policies, such as pharmaceutical companies paying for private clinic renovations. There is a need for policies to be clarified and updated, and to build buy-in for policy enforcement from pharmaceutical companies and physicians, such that transgressions on target-driven prescribing are seen to be unethical.

Identifiers

PMID37384598
PMCPMC10309616

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.