Cognition and Consciousness Entwined.

We argue that cognition (information processing) and internal phenomenological sensations, including emotions, are intimately related and are not separable. We aver that phenomenological sensations are dynamical "modes" of firing behaviour that (i) exist over time and over large parts of the cortex's neuron-to-neuron network and (ii) are consequences of the network-of-networks architecture, coupling the individual neuronal dynamics and the necessary time delay incurred by neuron-to-neuron transmission: if you possess those system properties, then you will have the dynamical modes and, thus, the phenomenological sensations. These modes are consequences of incoming external stimuli and are competitive within the system, suppressing and locking-out one another. On the other hand, the presence of any such mode acts as a preconditioner for the immediate (dynamic) cognitive processing of information. Thus, internal phenomenological sensations, including emotions, reduce the immediate decision set (of feasible interpretations) and hence the cognitive load. For organisms with such a mental inner life, there would clearly be a large cognitive evolutionary advantage, resulting in the well-known "thinking fast, thinking slow" phenomena. We call this the