Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37360988›Full record

ArticlePublic choice2023

How price-gouging regulation undermined COVID-19 mitigation: county-level evidence of unintended consequences.

Rik Chakraborti, Gavin Roberts

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Public choice, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Rik ChakrabortiDepartment of Economics, Christopher Newport University, Newport News, USA.
Gavin RobertsDepartment of Economics, Weber State University, Ogden, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Despite long-standing criticisms, restrictions on price increases during emergencies remain widespread in the US. Criticisms most often cite the social costs of the shortages, but, we have found another, as yet unknown, cost: price-gouging regulations increased social contact during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, thirty-four US states declared emergencies, which activated their preexisting price-gouging regulations, and eight others introduced new regulation along with their emergency declarations. Because these states border eight others that also declared emergencies, but had no price-gouging regulations, this created a unique natural experiment. Exploiting the pandemic-induced variation in regulation, and cellphone mobility data, we find that price controls increased visits to, and social contact in, commercial spaces, presumably because the regulation-induced shortages forced consumers to visit more stores and come in contact with more people as they struggled to find what they needed. This, of course, undermines social distancing efforts. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11127-023-01054-z.

Indexed as

COVID-19Price gougingRegulationSearchShortagesSocial contact

Identifiers

PMID37360988
PMCPMC10111309

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.