ArticlePloS one2023
Research on low-carbon dual channel supply chain considering product substitution under government carbon tax and low-carbon subsidy.
Article in PloS one, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Since dual channel supply chain has become one of the main modes of supply chain, its research has acquired great significance. This paper constructs a low-carbon dual channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer produces low-carbon product and high carbon product with substitution relationship. The retailer sells high carbon product in traditional channel. The manufacturer also sells low-carbon product in direct channel. The government, manufacturer and retailer conduct a three-level Stackelberg game. This paper studies the optimal decisions of the government, manufacturer and retailer under the three modes of carbon tax + subsidy, carbon tax only and subsidy only. It has been found that for social welfare, the carbon tax + subsidy model is higher than the subsidy model and carbon tax model. For manufacturer profit, the subsidy mode is the highest, followed by the carbon tax + subsidy mode. For retailer profit, the carbon tax + subsidy model is equal to the carbon tax model. The increase in the proportion of consumers who prefer high carbon product in the total market or product cost of low-carbon product, will increase the profit of traditional channel and reduce the profit of direct channel.
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Registered trials
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