Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37287707›Full record

ArticlePNAS nexus2023

Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation.

Xingru Chen, Feng Fu

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PNAS nexus, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. On the optimal integration of intelligent agents into network systems to steer cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Xingru ChenSchool of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9131-3798
Feng FuDepartment of Mathematics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, 03755 NH, USA.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8252-1990

Funding

Zhao - Proj 2P20GM130454 · NIGMS · DARTMOUTH COLLEGE · PI Chengxiang Qiu · 2019 to 2026
$27.2M
NIGMS NIH HHS P20 GM130454
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting coplayer should be subdued with full cooperation as their best response. In contrast, recent experiments demonstrate that human players often choose not to accede to extortion out of concern for fairness, actually causing extortioners to suffer more loss than themselves. In light of this, here we reveal fair-minded strategies that are

Indexed as

cooperationevolutionary game theoryfairnessreciprocityrepeated games

Identifiers

PMID37287707
PMCPMC10244001

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.