Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37276388›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2023

Evolution of norms for judging social behavior.

Taylor A Kessinger, Corina E Tarnita, Joshua B Plotkin

Open access · greenAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
19.1field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed, 33 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency-robustness trade-off.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. The Amygdala and Politics.Brain sciences · 2026
    Review
  4. Article
  5. Neural Bases of Collective Social Behavior and Group Interactions across Species.The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience · 2026
    Review
  6. Article
  7. Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  8. Article
  9. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  12. A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  13. When do stereotypes undermine indirect reciprocity?PLoS computational biology · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Taylor A KessingerDepartment of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.ORCID 0000-0001-7311-9414
Corina E TarnitaDepartment of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.ORCID 0000-0003-4476-0012
Joshua B PlotkinDepartment of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104.ORCID 0000-0003-2349-6304
University of Pennsylvania · USPrinceton University · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone's reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population-especially if it adopts the

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorModels, PsychologicalBiological EvolutionGame TheoryHumansSocial BehaviorSocial Normscooperationevolutionary game theoryindirect reciprocityreputationssocial evolution

Identifiers

PMID37276388
PMCPMC10268218
OpenAlexW4379469174

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.