Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37228099›Full record

ArticlePloS one2023

A novel privacy-preserving biometric authentication scheme.

Xuechun Mao, Ying Chen, Cong Deng, Xiaqing Zhou

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Xuechun MaoDepartment of Computer Science, Taizhou University, Taizhou, Zhejiang, China.
Ying ChenDepartment of Computer Science, Taizhou University, Taizhou, Zhejiang, China.ORCID 0000-0002-9520-3008
Cong DengHangzhou Jinritoutiao Technology Co., Ltd, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China.
Xiaqing ZhouMedical Records Division, Taizhou Hospital, Taizhou, Zhejiang, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Most existing secure biometric authentication schemes are server-centric, and users must fully trust the server to store, process, and manage their biometric data. As a result, users' biometric data could be leaked by outside attackers or the service provider itself. This paper first constructs the EDZKP protocol based on the inner product, which proves whether the secret value is the Euclidean distance of the secret vectors. Then, combined with the Cuproof protocol, we propose a novel user-centric biometric authentication scheme called BAZKP. In this scheme, all the biometric data remain encrypted during authentication phase, so the server will never see them directly. Meanwhile, the server can determine whether the Euclidean distance of two secret vectors is within a pre-defined threshold by calculation. Security analysis shows BAZKP satisfies completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge. Based on BAZKP, we propose a privacy-preserving biometric authentication system, and its evaluation demonstrates that it provides reliable and secure authentication.

Indexed as

Biometric IdentificationTelemedicineAlgorithmsBiometryComputer SecurityConfidentialityPrivacy

Identifiers

PMID37228099
PMCPMC10212112

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.