ArticleeLife2023
Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game.
Article in eLife, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.
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Who cites it
18 citing papers in PubMed.
- Individual and collective gains from cooperation and reciprocity in a dynamic-network Prisoner's Dilemma driven by extraversion, openness, and agreeableness.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Evolutionary path from a prisoner's dilemma to a harmony game via hawk-dove games.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games.PLoS computational biology · 2026Article
- Strategies for updating rules driven by reinforcement learning to solve social dilemmas.PloS one · 2026Article
- A Gamified Assessment Tool for Antisocial Personality Traits (Antisocial Personality Traits Evidence-Centered Design Gamified): Randomized Controlled Trial.JMIR serious games · 2025Article
- Strategic competition in informal risk-sharing mechanisms versus collective index insurance.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025Article
- A combined approach of evolutionary game and system dynamics for user privacy protection in human intelligence interaction.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- The impact of heterogeneous interpersonal relationships on promoting cooperation under the reputation mechanisms in public goods game.PloS one · 2025Article
- Article
- Investigating the impact of environmental feedback on the optional prisoner's dilemma for insights into cyclic dominance and evolution of cooperation.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk-dove games.BMC ecology and evolution · 2024Article
- Article
- The signaling role of feedback in the repeated public goods game: Experimental evidence from the laboratory.PloS one · 2024Article
- Managing ecological thresholds of a risky commons.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Article
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. Here, we develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.
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