ArticleTobacco control2024
Tobacco industry interference to undermine the development and implementation of graphic health warnings in Bangladesh.
Article in Tobacco control, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
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Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Unpacking complexities surrounding tobacco control policy formulation and tobacco industry interference in South Africa: a qualitative study.Health policy and planning · 2025Article
- Navigating Challenges in Tobacco Control: A Systematic Review of Barriers to Implementing Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).Addiction & health · 2025Review
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6 authors.
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Abstract
backgroundIn Bangladesh, the 2013 Amendment of the Tobacco Control Act made graphic health warnings (GHWs) on the
methodsAnalysis of print and electronic media articles and documents.
resultsCigarette companies actively opposed GHWs, while bidi companies did not. The primary strategy used to influence the formulation and delay the implementation of GHWs was direct lobbying by the Bangladesh Cigarette Manufacturers' Association and British American Tobacco Bangladesh. Their arguments stressed the economic benefits of tobacco to Bangladesh and sought to create confusion about the impact of GHWs, for example, claiming that GHWs would obscure tax banderols, thus threatening revenue collection. They also claimed technical barriers to implementation-that new machinery would be needed-leading to delays. Tensions between government bodies were identified, one of which (National Board of Revenue)-seemingly close to cigarette companies and representing their arguments-sought to influence others to adopt industry-preferred positions. Finally, although tobacco control advocates were partially successful in counteracting TII, one self-proclaimed tobacco control group, whose nature remains unclear, threatened the otherwise united approach.
conclusionsThe strategies cigarette companies used closely resemble key techniques from the well-evidenced tobacco industry playbook. The study underlines the importance of continuing monitoring and investigations into industry conduct and suspicious actors. Prioritising the implementation of WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Article 5.3 is crucial for advancing tobacco control, particularly in places like Bangladesh, where close government-industry links exist.
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