Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37155910›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2023

Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment.

Yuma Fujimoto, Hisashi Ohtsuki

Open access · greenAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
16.8field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 29 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Social norms and group-bounded indirect reciprocity.Evolutionary human sciences · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  5. Self-organized institutions in evolutionary dynamical-systems games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  8. Article
  9. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  10. Article
  11. A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Yuma FujimotoResearch Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama 240-0193, Japan.ORCID 0000-0002-5436-3363
Hisashi OhtsukiResearch Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies), Hayama 240-0193, Japan.ORCID 0000-0001-7662-036X
The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, SOKENDAI · JP

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to stable cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the evolution of human cooperation.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorModels, PsychologicalBiological EvolutionHumansSocial Normscooperationindirect reciprocityprivate assessmentsimple standing

Identifiers

PMID37155910
PMCPMC10194006
OpenAlexW4375955320

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.