Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37139484›Full record

ArticleJournal of development economics2023

Social and financial incentives for overcoming a collective action problem.

M Mehrab Bakhtiar, Raymond P Guiteras, James Levinsohn, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of development economics, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Trial
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Evidence on designing sanitation interventions.Journal of development economics · 2024
    Article
  5. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

M Mehrab BakhtiarInternational Food Policy Research Institute, House 10A, Road 35, Gulshan 2, Dhaka 1212, Bangladesh.
Raymond P GuiterasNorth Carolina State University, Nelson Hall, Campus Box 8109, Raleigh NC, 27695, USA.
James LevinsohnYale University, 165 Whitney Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA.
Ahmed Mushfiq MobarakYale University, 165 Whitney Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Due to social norms, each person's sanitation investment decisions may depend on the decisions of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we grouped neighboring households and introduced (either financial or social recognition) rewards with a joint liability component for the group, or asked each group member to make a private or public pledge to maintain a hygienic latrine. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5-12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership, but this effect dissipates in the medium term (15 months). In contrast, the public commitment induced a 4.2-6.3 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term, but this effect persists in the medium term. Non-financial social recognition or a private pledge has no detectable effect on sanitation investments.

Indexed as

Collective action problemsDevelopmentEnvironmentSanitation

Identifiers

PMID37139484
PMCPMC10115903

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.