ArticleCampbell systematic reviews2019
PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms' financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?
Article in Campbell systematic reviews, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed.
- Insights into healthcare public managers' compensation: Influential factors and sustainable financing solutions: A scoping review.Journal of education and health promotion · 2025Review
- Does chief executive compensation predict financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting in listed companies: A systematic review.Campbell systematic reviews · 2023Review
- PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms' financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?Campbell systematic reviews · 2019Article
Corrections and comments
- Updated by
Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.