Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37123926›Full record

ArticleHeliyon2023

Game analysis of enterprise safety investment and employee safety behavior strategy evolution in high-risk industries.

Youcai Xie, Gang Lu, Desheng Lai, Meng Tao

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Heliyon, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
1.5field-weighted citation impact, top 20% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 6 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Youcai XieGuangzhou HuaShang College, Guangzhou 511300,China.
Gang LuChina University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116,China.
Desheng LaiGuangzhou HuaShang College, Guangzhou 511300,China.
Meng TaoGuangzhou HuaShang College, Guangzhou 511300,China.
Guangzhou Automobile Group (China) · CNChina University of Mining and Technology · CNGuangzhou Huashang College

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper aims to explore the influential relationship between the decision-making of investment of enterprise safety and employee safety behavior strategy selection, thus improve the effectiveness of decision-making. Based on traditional game theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of enterprise safety investment and employee safety behavior strategy selection, and conducts numerical simulation analysis. The result shows:when the security investment cost is greater than the security investment benefit, the employee's security behavior strategy choice is significant for the enterprise security investment strategy decision; when the security investment benefit is greater than the security investment cost, the enterprise security investment decision is not affected by the employee safety behavior strategy; the choice of employee safety behavior strategy is not affected by the choice of enterprise safety investment strategy. The conclusion can provide a reference basis for enterprise safety production decision-making, which has certain theoretical and practical significance.

Indexed as

Evolutionary gameNumerical simulationSafety behaviorSecurity investment

Identifiers

PMID37123926
PMCPMC10133657
OpenAlexW4364355788

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.