Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37120261›Full record

ReviewThe Lancet. Public health2023

Fair domestic allocation of monkeypox virus countermeasures.

Govind Persad, R J Leland, Trygve Ottersen, Henry S Richardson, Carla Saenz, G Owen Schaefer, Ezekiel J Emanuel

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in The Lancet. Public health, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Evaluating infectious disease forecasts with allocation scoring rules.Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A, (Statistics in Society) · 2024
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors.

Govind PersadSturm College of Law, University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA.
R J LelandDepartment of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
Trygve OttersenDivision of Infection Control, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway.
Henry S RichardsonDepartment of Philosophy and Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA.
Carla SaenzDepartment of Evidence and Intelligence for Action in Health, Pan American Health Organization, Washington, DC, USA.
G Owen SchaeferCentre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
Ezekiel J EmanuelDepartment of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. Electronic address: zemanuel@upenn.edu.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Countermeasures for mpox (formerly known as monkeypox), primarily vaccines, have been in limited supply in many countries during outbreaks. Equitable allocation of scarce resources during public health emergencies is a complex challenge. Identifying the objectives and core values for the allocation of mpox countermeasures, using those values to provide guidance for priority groups and prioritisation tiers, and optimising allocation implementation are important. The fundamental values for the allocation of mpox countermeasures are: preventing death and illness; reducing the association between death or illness and unjust disparities; prioritising those who prevent harm or mitigate disparities; recognising contributions to combating an outbreak; and treating similar individuals similarly. Ethically and equitably marshalling available countermeasures requires articulating these fundamental objectives, identifying priority tiers, and recognising trade-offs between prioritising the people at the highest risk of infection and the people at the highest risk of harm if infected. These five values can provide guidance on preferable priority categories for a more ethically sound response and suggest methods for optimising allocation of countermeasures for mpox and other diseases for which countermeasures are in short supply. Properly marshalling available countermeasures will be crucial for future effective and equitable national responses to outbreaks.

Indexed as

Monkeypox virusMpox, MonkeypoxDisease OutbreaksHumansPublic Health

Identifiers

PMID37120261
PMCPMC10139192

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.