Evidence map›Paper›PMID 37112981›Full record

ArticleViruses2023

The Role of Airborne Particles in the Epidemiology of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus in Commercial Poultry Production Units.

Joe James, Caroline J Warren, Dilhani De Silva, Thomas Lewis, Katherine Grace, Scott M Reid, Marco Falchieri, Ian H Brown, Ashley C Banyard

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Viruses, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
27citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

27 citing papers in PubMed.

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  18. Rapid mortality in captive bush dogs (Emerging microbes & infections · 2024
    Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Joe JamesDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-9673-3684
Caroline J WarrenDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Dilhani De SilvaDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Thomas LewisDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Katherine GraceEpidemiology and Risk Policy Advice, Advice Services, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Scott M ReidDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Marco FalchieriDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Ian H BrownDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.
Ashley C BanyardDepartment of Virology, Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA-Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone KT15 3NB, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-1286-9825

Funding

Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council BB/X006204/1
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 284 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1-positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have presented as geographical clusters, raising questions about the lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIV strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs were confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious viruses were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside but in close proximity to infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected at greater distances (≤10 m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious viruses, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 80 m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harboring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10 m) through the air, while macroscopic particles containing vRNA might travel further (≤80 m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds and the efficiency of biosecurity, represent greater importance in disease incursion.

Indexed as

Influenza A virusInfluenza A Virus, H5N1 SubtypeInfluenza in BirdsPoultry DiseasesAnimalsAnimals, WildChickensDucksPoultryRNA, ViralVirulenceRNA, Viralaerosolairborneavianavian influenza virusdropletdustH5N1transmission

Identifiers

PMID37112981
PMCPMC10142477

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.