ArticleHeliyon2023
Behavioural strategies of manufacturing firms for high-quality development from the perspective of government participation: A three-part evolutionary game analysis.
Article in Heliyon, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed.
- A study on collaborative governance of excessive medical care based on three-way evolutionary game and simulation.Frontiers in public health · 2025Article
- Article
- What drives the green development behavior of local governments? A perspective of grounded theory.Heliyon · 2024Article
- Steady-state analysis of social responsibility strategy of coal power enterprises from the perspective of game theory.Heliyon · 2024Article
- Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is not only a requirement of industrial transformation and upgrading but also an internal task for the sustainable development of manufacturing enterprises. The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is a process of multi-participation and dynamic evolution. To understand the evolution of the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry, an evolutionary game model composed of local governments, leading enterprises, and following enterprises is constructed. The evolution process and the influence of internal factors such as innovation capability, organization construction and industry resources on the evolution and stability strategy are analysed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulations. The results show that (1) there are two possible evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) models in the game, namely, {active supervision, positive participation, positive participation} and {active supervision, negative participation, negative participation}; (2) when the initial probabilities of leading and following enterprises are all at low levels, increasing any one of the local government's initial probability, innovation capability, organization construction and industry resources can promote tripartite evolution towards {active supervision, positive participation, positive participation}; and (3) the convergence rate of leading enterprises and following enterprises evolving towards a positive participation strategy will increase slightly with an increase in local government's initial probability, innovation capability, organization construction, and industry resources when both are at middle initial probability levels. The final policy suggestions can be used to help all parties choose the optimal strategy and to achieve the high-quality development target of the manufacturing industry as soon as possible.
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