Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36989284›Full record

ArticlePloS one2023

Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice.

Lin Song, Zhenlei Yu, Qiang He

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Lin SongTianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Tianjin, China.ORCID 0000-0001-5568-8090
Zhenlei YuInformation Ministry of Library, Qilu University of Technology, Jinan, China.ORCID 0000-0002-4354-2972
Qiang HeTianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, Tianjin, China.ORCID 0000-0002-8229-5476

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Doctors and patients are the two critical players in medical malpractice. The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor-patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors' standardized practice income. Measures to effectively resolve medical malpractice are proposed by introducing a third-party normative system, establishing a doctor-patient information management system, and improving doctors' reward and punishment mechanisms.

Indexed as

MalpracticePhysiciansGame TheoryHumansPhysician-Patient RelationsPunishment

Identifiers

PMID36989284
PMCPMC10057828

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.