Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36966480›Full record

ArticleThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care2024

Pay-for-performance programs effectiveness in healthcare: the case of the end-stage renal disease quality incentive program.

Saeed Piri

Abstract read
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Article in The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Preventable Hospitalizations and Kidney Care.Clinical journal of the American Society of Nephrology : CJASN · 2026
    Review
  3. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Saeed PiriDepartment of Operations and Business Analytics, Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, 97403, USA. spiri@uoregon.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9383-0756

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper focuses on Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP). QIP aims to promote high-quality services in outpatient dialysis facilities by tying their payments to their performance on pre-specified quality measures. In this paper, employing principal-agent theory, we examine the effectiveness of QIP by exploring the changes in various clinical/operational measures when they become a part of the program as a performance measure. We study five QIP quality measures; two are operational: hospitalization and readmission. And three others are clinical: blood transfusion, hypercalcemia, and dialysis adequacy. Overall, we observe a significant improvement in all QIP quality measures after being included in the program, except for readmission. We recommend adjusting the weight and redesigning the readmission measure for Medicare to incentivize providers to reduce readmission. We also discuss establishing care coordination and employing data-driven clinical decision support systems as opportunities for dialysis facilities to improve the care delivery process.

Indexed as

Kidney Failure, ChronicRenal DialysisAgedDelivery of Health CareHumansMedicareMotivationReimbursement, IncentiveUnited StatesDialysis facilitiesEmpiricalHealthcare paymentHealth economyPay-for-performance

Identifiers

PMID36966480

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.