Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36934760›Full record

ReviewPhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2023

The future of theoretical evolutionary game theory.

Arne Traulsen, Nikoleta E Glynatsi

Full text readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 21 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
21citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

21 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Evolution of noisy learning in games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
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  4. On the optimal integration of intelligent agents into network systems to steer cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
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  11. Picking strategies in games of cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
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  12. Drivers of cooperation in social dilemmas on higher-order networks.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025
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  13. Reconciling ecology and evolutionary game theory or "When not to think cooperation".Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
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  19. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Arne TraulsenDepartment of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.ORCID 0000-0002-0669-5267
Nikoleta E GlynatsiMax Planck Research Group: Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory is a truly interdisciplinary subject that goes well beyond the limits of biology. Mathematical minds get hooked up in simple models for evolution and often gradually move into other parts of evolutionary biology or ecology. Social scientists realize how much they can learn from evolutionary thinking and gradually transfer insight that was originally generated in biology. Computer scientists can use their algorithms to explore a new field where machines not only learn from the environment, but also from each other. The breadth of the field and the focus on a few very popular issues, such as cooperation, comes at a price: several insights are re-discovered in different fields under different labels with different heroes and modelling traditions. For example, reciprocity or spatial structure are treated differently. Will we continue to develop things in parallel? Or can we converge to a single set of ideas, a single tradition and eventually a single software repository? Or will these fields continue to cross-fertilize each other, learning from each other and engaging in a constructive exchange between fields? Ultimately, the popularity of evolutionary game theory rests not only on its explanatory power, but also on the intuitive character of its models. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionGame TheoryAlgorithmsCooperative BehaviorEcologyModels, TheoreticalSoftwarebibliometric datacooperationevolutionary game theory

Identifiers

PMID36934760
PMCPMC10024985

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.