ReviewPhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2023
Stackelberg evolutionary game theory: how to manage evolving systems.
Review in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers.
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14 citing papers in PubMed, 48 citations in OpenAlex.
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- Natural disaster emergency response from a public policy perspective: a four-party evolutionary game among government, international organizations, healthcare institutions, and enterprises.Frontiers in public health · 2025Article
- Stability of the Darwinian Dynamics: Effect of Intraspecific Competition and Human Intervention.Dynamic games and applications · 2025Article
- Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?Dynamic games and applications · 2025Article
- Validation of polymorphic Gompertzian model of cancer through in vitro and in vivo data.PloS one · 2025Article
- Research on the mechanism of human-machine security collaboration of miners considering automation trust.Heliyon · 2024Article
- Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- A war on many fronts: cross disciplinary approaches for novel cancer treatment strategies.Frontiers in genetics · 2024Review
- The effect of tumor composition on the success of adaptive therapy: The case of metastatic Castrate-Resistant Prostate Cancer.PloS one · 2024Article
- Stackelberg evolutionary game theory: how to manage evolving systems.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023Review
- Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023Article
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Authors and funding
7 authors at 4 institutions in 4 countries.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Stackelberg evolutionary game (SEG) theory combines classical and evolutionary game theory to frame interactions between a rational leader and evolving followers. In some of these interactions, the leader wants to preserve the evolving system (e.g. fisheries management), while in others, they try to drive the system to extinction (e.g. pest control). Often the worst strategy for the leader is to adopt a constant aggressive strategy (e.g. overfishing in fisheries management or maximum tolerable dose in cancer treatment). Taking into account the ecological dynamics typically leads to better outcomes for the leader and corresponds to the Nash equilibria in game-theoretic terms. However, the leader's most profitable strategy is to anticipate and steer the eco-evolutionary dynamics, leading to the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. We show how our results have the potential to help in fields where humans try to bring an evolutionary system into the desired outcome, such as, among others, fisheries management, pest management and cancer treatment. Finally, we discuss limitations and opportunities for applying SEGs to improve the management of evolving biological systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.
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