Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36934754›Full record

ReviewPhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2023

Evolutionarily stable strategy analysis and its links to demography and genetics through invasion fitness.

Jeremy Van Cleve

Full text readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Reconciling ecology and evolutionary game theory or "When not to think cooperation".Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Jeremy Van CleveDepartment of Biology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506 USA.ORCID 0000-0003-3656-4257

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price took off in part because it often does not require explicit assumptions about the genetics and demography of a population in contrast to population genetic models. Though this simplicity is useful, it obscures the degree to which ESS analysis applies to populations with more realistic genetics and demography: for example, how does ESS analysis handle complexities such as kin selection, group selection and variable environments when phenotypes are affected by multiple genes? In this paper, I review the history of the ESS concept and show how early uncertainty about the method lead to important mathematical theory linking ESS analysis to general population genetic models. I use this theory to emphasize the link between ESS analysis and the concept of

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionGame TheoryDemographyHumansModels, GeneticPhenotypeSelection, GeneticUncertaintyevolutionarily stable strategygroup selectionkin selectionlineage fitnessreduction principlevariable environments

Identifiers

PMID36934754
PMCPMC10024993

What OpenQuestion holds

Textfull text, public
LicenceCC BY
measurements read8
table measurements read1
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.