Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36934745›Full record

ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2023

Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations.

Xiaomin Wang, Marta C Couto, Nianyi Wang, Xinmiao An, Bin Chen, Yali Dong, Christian Hilbe, Boyu Zhang

Full text read
In one paragraph

Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Evolution of noisy learning in games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  2. The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric public goods games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023
    Article
  10. Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

8 authors.

Xiaomin WangLaboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
Marta C CoutoMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.
Nianyi WangLaboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
Xinmiao AnLaboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
Bin ChenSchool of Environment, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
Yali DongSchool of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.
Christian HilbeMax Planck Research Group Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.
Boyu ZhangLaboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People's Republic of China.ORCID 0000-0003-0972-3240

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

One landmark application of evolutionary game theory is the study of social dilemmas. This literature explores why people cooperate even when there are strong incentives to defect. Much of this literature, however, assumes that interactions are symmetric. Individuals are assumed to have the same strategic options and the same potential pay-offs. Yet many interesting questions arise once individuals are allowed to differ. Here, we study asymmetry in simple coordination games. In our set-up, human participants need to decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a public good. If a group's collective contribution reaches a pre-defined threshold, all group members receive a reward. To account for possible asymmetries, individuals either differ in their endowments or their productivities. According to a theoretical equilibrium analysis, such games tend to have many possible solutions. In equilibrium, group members may contribute the same amount, different amounts or nothing at all. According to our behavioural experiment, however, humans favour the equilibrium in which everyone contributes the same proportion of their endowment. We use these experimental results to highlight the non-trivial effects of inequality on cooperation, and we discuss to which extent models of evolutionary game theory can account for these effects. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryBiological EvolutionHumansMotivationRewardasymmetric gamecooperationcoordinationevolutionary game theoryinequalitythreshold public goods game

Identifiers

PMID36934745
PMCPMC10024987

What OpenQuestion holds

Textfull text, public
LicenceCC BY
measurements read5
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.