ArticleFrontiers in health services2022
Decision Thresholds for Medical Tests Under Ambiguity Aversion.
Article in Frontiers in health services, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- The Role of Cancer-Related Fatalistic Beliefs and Perceived Information Ambiguity in Lung Cancer Screening Uptake.Clinical journal of oncology nursing · 2026Article
- Decision threshold models in medical decision making: a scoping literature review.BMC medical informatics and decision making · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
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Abstract
We consider medical decision-making under diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainty and analyze how ambiguity aversion affects the decisions to test and treat, thereby contributing to the understanding of the observed heterogeneity of such decisions. We show that under diagnostic ambiguity (i.e., the probability of disease is ambiguous), prior testing becomes more attractive if the default option is no treatment and less so if the default option is treatment. Conversely, with therapeutic ambiguity (i.e., the probability of a successful treatment is ambiguous), ambiguity aversion reduces the tolerance toward treatment failure so that the test option is chosen at a lower probability of failure. We differentiate between conditional and unconditional ambiguity aversion and show that this differentiation has implications for the propensity to test. We conclude by discussing the normative scope of ambiguity aversion for the recommendations and decisions of regulatory bodies.
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