Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36925520›Full record

ArticleHeliyon2023

Dynamic coopetition game between private label and national brand under carbon trading policy.

Wenfang Yu, Guisheng Hou, Yu He, Baogui Xin

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Article in Heliyon, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Wenfang YuCollege of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.
Guisheng HouCollege of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.
Yu HeCollege of International Exchange, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.
Baogui XinCollege of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, 266590, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The increasing environmental concerns have changed the coopetition behavior between private-label (PL) retailers and national-brand (NB) manufacturers, which needs firms to reconsider their competitive and cooperative strategies to cope with this change. To address this need, we incorporate carbon trading policy into dynamic coopetition game models between a PL retailer and an NB manufacturer. We examine their dynamic evolution trajectories of state variables, decision variables, and profit value functions by using numerical simulation. The sensitivity analysis shows that: (i) some key parameters affect the steady-state values of variables and profit value functions; (ii) the relative strengths of the NB manufacturer and the PL retailer affect decision variables and profit value functions. The results indicate that the carbon trading policy significantly affects dynamic coopetition between the PL retailer and the NB manufacturer.

Indexed as

Carbon trading policyCoopetition differential gameDynamic coopetition gameNational-brand (NB) manufacturerPrivate-label (PL) retailer

Identifiers

PMID36925520
PMCPMC10010995

What OpenQuestion holds

Textfull text, public
LicenceCC BY
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identifiers read1
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.