Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36895643›Full record

ReviewiScience2023

Safety by design: Biosafety and biosecurity in the age of synthetic genomics.

Stefan A Hoffmann, James Diggans, Douglas Densmore, Junbiao Dai, Tom Knight, Emily Leproust, Jef D Boeke, Nicole Wheeler, Yizhi Cai

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in iScience, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 31 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
31citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

31 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Genomic Impacts of Biological Exposures.Journal of developmental biology · 2026
    Review
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Review
  5. Review
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Developing a standard definition for sequences of concern.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026
    Article
  9. Review
  10. Article
  11. Review
  12. Article
  13. The design and engineering of synthetic genomes.Nature reviews. Genetics · 2025
    Review
  14. Review
  15. Diagnosing and engineering gut microbiomes.EMBO molecular medicine · 2024
    Review
  16. Progress and Prospects for a Nucleic Acid Screening Test Set.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024
    Article
  17. Five Things Not to Do When Discovering a Biosecurity Vulnerability.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024
    Article
  18. Article
  19. Practical Questions for Securing Nucleic Acid Synthesis.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Stefan A HoffmannManchester Institute of Biotechnology, University of Manchester, 131 Princess Street, Manchester M1 7DN, UK.
James DiggansTwist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, CA 9408, USA.
Douglas DensmoreDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Boston University, 610 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215, USA.
Junbiao DaiCAS Key Laboratory of Quantitative Engineering Biology, Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Synthetic Genomics and Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Synthetic Genomics, Shenzhen Institute of Synthetic Biology, Shenzhen Institute of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shenzhen, China.
Tom KnightGinkgo Bioworks, 27 Drydock Avenue, Boston, MA 02210, USA.
Emily LeproustTwist Bioscience, 681 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco, CA 9408, USA.
Jef D BoekeInstitute for Systems Genetics, and Department of Biochemistry & Molecular Pharmacology, NYU Langone Health, 435 East 30th Street, New York, NY 10016, USA.
Nicole WheelerInstitute of Microbiology and Infection, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK.
Yizhi CaiManchester Institute of Biotechnology, University of Manchester, 131 Princess Street, Manchester M1 7DN, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Technologies to profoundly engineer biology are becoming increasingly affordable, powerful, and accessible to a widening group of actors. While offering tremendous potential to fuel biological research and the bioeconomy, this development also increases the risk of inadvertent or deliberate creation and dissemination of pathogens. Effective regulatory and technological frameworks need to be developed and deployed to manage these emerging biosafety and biosecurity risks. Here, we review digital and biological approaches of a range of technology readiness levels suited to address these challenges. Digital sequence screening technologies already are used to control access to synthetic DNA of concern. We examine the current state of the art of sequence screening, challenges and future directions, and environmental surveillance for the presence of engineered organisms. As biosafety layer on the organism level, we discuss genetic biocontainment systems that can be used to created host organisms with an intrinsic barrier against unchecked environmental proliferation.

Indexed as

Biological sciencesGenomicsSystems biology

Identifiers

PMID36895643
PMCPMC9988571

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.