Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36860662›Full record

ArticleEFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority2023

SARS-CoV-2 in animals: susceptibility of animal species, risk for animal and public health, monitoring, prevention and control.

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW), Søren Saxmose Nielsen, Julio Alvarez, Dominique Joseph Bicout, Paolo Calistri, Elisabetta Canali, Julian Ashley Drewe, Bruno Garin-Bastuji, José Luis Gonzales Rojas, Christian Gortázar and 19 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 38 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
38citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

38 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Review
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Wild red foxes (One health (Amsterdam, Netherlands) · 2024
    Article
  15. Article
  16. SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in lions, tigers and hyenas at Denver Zoo.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2024
    Article
  17. Article
  18. Improving the ONE HEALTH approach: a lesson from SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.Journal of preventive medicine and hygiene · 2024
    Review
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

29 authors.

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW)
Søren Saxmose Nielsen
Julio Alvarez
Dominique Joseph Bicout
Paolo Calistri
Elisabetta Canali
Julian Ashley Drewe
Bruno Garin-Bastuji
José Luis Gonzales Rojas
Christian Gortázar
Mette Herskin
Virginie Michel
Miguel Ángel Miranda Chueca
Barbara Padalino
Paolo Pasquali
Helen Clare Roberts
Hans Spoolder
Antonio Velarde
Arvo Viltrop
Christoph Winckler
Cornelia Adlhoch
Inmaculada Aznar
Francesca Baldinelli
Anette Boklund
Alessandro Broglia
Nora Gerhards
Lina Mur
Priyanka Nannapaneni
Karl Ståhl

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and animals is continually evolving. To date, animal species known to transmit SARS-CoV-2 are American mink, raccoon dog, cat, ferret, hamster, house mouse, Egyptian fruit bat, deer mouse and white-tailed deer. Among farmed animals, American mink have the highest likelihood to become infected from humans or animals and further transmit SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, 44 outbreaks were reported in 2021 in mink farms in seven MSs, while only six in 2022 in two MSs, thus representing a decreasing trend. The introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into mink farms is usually via infected humans; this can be controlled by systematically testing people entering farms and adequate biosecurity. The current most appropriate monitoring approach for mink is the outbreak confirmation based on suspicion, testing dead or clinically sick animals in case of increased mortality or positive farm personnel and the genomic surveillance of virus variants. The genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 showed mink-specific clusters with a potential to spill back into the human population. Among companion animals, cats, ferrets and hamsters are those at highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which most likely originates from an infected human, and which has no or very low impact on virus circulation in the human population. Among wild animals (including zoo animals), mostly carnivores, great apes and white-tailed deer have been reported to be naturally infected by SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, no cases of infected wildlife have been reported so far. Proper disposal of human waste is advised to reduce the risks of spill-over of SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife. Furthermore, contact with wildlife, especially if sick or dead, should be minimised. No specific monitoring for wildlife is recommended apart from testing hunter-harvested animals with clinical signs or found-dead. Bats should be monitored as a natural host of many coronaviruses.

Indexed as

controlminkmonitoringpreventionpublic healthSARS‐CoV‐2wildlife

Identifiers

PMID36860662
PMCPMC9968901

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.