Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36776748›Full record

ArticleApplied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association2022

It's the Wrong Virus: Rapid Adaptation of Operations Inside a Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Select Agent Laboratory in Response to the 2019 SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic.

Lisa Kercher, Patrick Seiler, Trushar Jeevan, John Franks, Sanja Trifkovic, Bindumadhav Marathe, James Henry, James Gaut, Richard J Webby

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Lisa KercherDepartment of Infectious Diseases and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
Patrick SeilerDepartment of Infectious Diseases and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
Trushar JeevanDepartment of Infectious Diseases and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
John FranksDepartment of Infectious Diseases and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
Sanja TrifkovicDepartment of Infectious Diseases and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
Bindumadhav MaratheDepartment of Environmental Health and Safety, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
James HenryDepartment of Environmental Health and Safety, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
James GautDepartment of Environmental Health and Safety, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.
Richard J WebbyDepartment of Infectious Diseases and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Background: The Animal Biosafety Level 3 Enhanced (ABSL-3+) laboratory at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital has a long history of influenza pandemic preparedness. The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and subsequent expansion into a pandemic has put new and unanticipated demands on laboratory operations since April 2020. Administrative changes, investigative methods requiring increased demand for inactivation and validation of sample removal, and the adoption of a new animal model into the space required all arms of our Biorisk Management System (BMS) to respond with speed and innovation. Results: In this report, we describe the outcomes of three major operational changes that were implemented to adapt the ABSL-3+ select agent space into a multipathogen laboratory. First were administrative controls that were revised and developed with new Institutional Biosafety Committee protocols, laboratory space segregation, training of staff, and occupational health changes for potential exposure to SARS-CoV-2 inside the laboratory. Second were extensive inactivation and validation experiments performed for both highly pathogenic avian influenza and SARS-CoV-2 to meet the demands for sample removal to a lower biosafety level. Third was the establishment of a new caging system to house Syrian Golden hamsters for SARS-CoV-2 risk assessment modeling. Summary: The demands placed on biocontainment laboratories for response to SARS-CoV-2 has highlighted the importance of a robust BMS. In a relatively short time, the ABSL-3+ was able to adapt from a single select agent space to a multipathogen laboratory and expand our pandemic response capacity.

Indexed as

biorisk managementhamsterIBCinactivationinfluenzaSARS-CoV-2

Identifiers

PMID36776748
PMCPMC9908283

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.