Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36761249›Full record

ArticleJournal of environmental and public health2023

The Supervision Mechanism of Residents' Waste Separation Behavior: Analysis Using a Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model.

Mengge Hao, Shichun Xu, Jingnan Zhang, Xiaona Meng

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of environmental and public health, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Mengge HaoSchool of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China.ORCID 0000-0001-6753-7038
Shichun XuSchool of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China.ORCID 0000-0002-7935-1289
Jingnan ZhangSchool of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China.
Xiaona MengSchool of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China.ORCID 0000-0002-8643-9457

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

To promote residents' waste separation behavior, waste separation supervision has been a crucial need. This paper aims to explore the supervision mechanism of residents' waste separation behavior using a tripartite evolutionary game model. The evolutionary stability conditions of resident, property service enterprise, and the government were analyzed. The influences of the main parameters on the strategy of three stakeholders were explored through numerical simulation. The results show that the regulatory mechanism of waste separation will reach the optimal stable strategy when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the penalty for nonclassification is higher than the difference between classification cost and the total benefit of classification; (2) the subsidy to property services enterprise is greater than the total cost of positive participation management. Residents' behaviors are mainly influenced by rewards and punishments. The behavioral strategies of property service companies are more sensitive to subsidies than penalties. In the early stage of mandatory waste separation, it is important to reduce the cost of residents' separation, develop the publics' environmental awareness, and increase the willingness of properties to participate in management. This paper presents a new perspective and theoretical guidelines for the local government and communities to supervise residents' waste separation behaviors in China and other developing countries and offers useful insights into waste separation management for other countries.

Indexed as

Waste ManagementChina

Identifiers

PMID36761249
PMCPMC9904907

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.