Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36699738›Full record

ArticlePatterns (New York, N.Y.)2023

Detrimental network effects in privacy: A graph-theoretic model for node-based intrusions.

Florimond Houssiau, Piotr Sapieżyński, Laura Radaelli, Erez Shmueli, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Patterns (New York, N.Y.), 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
0.4field-weighted citation impact, top 29% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed, 1 citations in OpenAlex.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 4 institutions in 3 countries.

Florimond HoussiauThe Alan Turing Institute, 2QR, John Dodson House, 96 Euston Road, London NW1 2DB, UK.
Piotr SapieżyńskiNortheastern University, 360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
Laura RadaelliDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel.
Erez ShmueliDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel.
Yves-Alexandre de MontjoyeImperial College London, Exhibition Road, South Kensington, London SW7 2BX, UK.
Tel Aviv University · ILImperial College London · GBNortheastern University · USTuring Institute · GB

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Despite proportionality being one of the tenets of data protection laws, we currently lack a robust analytical framework to evaluate the reach of modern data collections and the network effects at play. Here, we propose a graph-theoretic model and notions of node- and edge-observability to quantify the reach of networked data collections. We first prove closed-form expressions for our metrics and quantify the impact of the graph's structure on observability. Second, using our model, we quantify how (1) from 270,000 compromised accounts, Cambridge Analytica collected 68.0M Facebook profiles; (2) from surveilling 0.01% of the nodes in a mobile phone network, a law enforcement agency could observe 18.6% of all communications; and (3) an app installed on 1% of smartphones could monitor the location of half of the London population through close proximity tracing. Better quantifying the reach of data collection mechanisms is essential to evaluate their proportionality.

Indexed as

networksprivacysocial networkssurveillance

Identifiers

PMID36699738
PMCPMC9868678
OpenAlexW4315874250

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.