Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36543962›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of health economics and management2023

The effect of performance pay incentives on market frictions: evidence from medicare.

Atul Gupta, Guy David, Lucy Kim

Abstract read
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In one paragraph

Article in International journal of health economics and management, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Atul GuptaThe Wharton School, 3641 Locust Walk, 306 CPC, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA. atulgup@wharton.upenn.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8446-1909
Guy DavidThe Wharton School and NBER, Philadelphia, USA.
Lucy KimGoogle, Menlo Park, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Medicare has increased the use of performance pay incentives for hospitals, with the goal of increasing care coordination across providers, reducing market frictions, and ultimately to improve quality of care. This paper provides new empirical evidence by using novel operations and claims data from a large, independent home health care firm with the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) penalty on hospitals providing identifying variation. We find that the penalty incentive to reduce re-hospitalizations passed through from hospitals to the firm for at least some types of patients, since it provided more care inputs for heart disease patients discharged from hospitals at greater penalty risk and that contributed more patients to the firm. This evidence suggests that HRRP helped increase coordination between hospitals and home health firms without formal integration. Greater home health effort does not appear to have led to lower patient readmissions.

Indexed as

MedicareMotivationAgedFrictionHospitalsHumansPatient ReadmissionUnited StatesHome health careHospital readmissions reduction programPerformance pay

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.