Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36471529›Full record

ArticleWaste management & research : the journal of the International Solid Wastes and Public Cleansing Association, ISWA2023

An evolutionary game analysis on price competition in recycling industry between large and small enterprises of China.

Zhang Yu, Syed Abdul Rehman Khan, Hafiz Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, Tianshan Ma, Muhammad Jawad Sajid

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Waste management & research : the journal of the International Solid Wastes and Public Cleansing Association, ISWA, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Zhang YuSchool of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an, China.ORCID 0000-0002-9892-7642
Syed Abdul Rehman KhanSchool of Management and Engineering, Xuzhou University of Technology, Xuzhou, China.ORCID 0000-0001-5197-2318
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-Ul-HaqFaculty of Business, Economics, and Social Development, Universiti Malaysia Terengganu, Kuala Nerus, Malaysia.
Tianshan MaSchool of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an, China.
Muhammad Jawad SajidSchool of Management and Engineering, Xuzhou University of Technology, Xuzhou, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This research aims to analyse and understand recycling phenomena and competition between large-scale and small-scale enterprises under different public attention. It mainly emphasizes service-providing behaviours to the consumers in the recycling industry, where recyclers are struggling to enhance their profits. The government strives to protect the environment by promoting an efficient recycling industry. As fast-growing waste products, the recyclers should achieve the advantage of number and be equipped with service capability for the consumers. Thus, this study employs an evolutionary game model to analyse the competition for waste products acquisitions between large and small recyclers. Due to a significant association between the service and acquisition waste product price for the consumers and recycling quantity, there is a strong mutual influence between the acquisition price of waste products and the price strategy-taken rate of large and small recyclers. Results also reveal that the market acquisition price and processing cost play a crucial role in recyclers' decision-making on setting prices for acquiring waste products from consumers. Furthermore, it is also found that waste products acquisition price and recyclers' processing cost are the key factors that affect large and small recyclers' recycling quantity.

Indexed as

Waste ManagementChinaIndustryRecyclingWaste ProductsWaste Productsacquisition price competitionevolutionary game modellarge-scale recyclersRecycling industry

Identifiers

PMID36471529
PMCPMC9925903

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.