Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36471096›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2022

The evolutionary extortion game of multiple groups in hypernetworks.

Aizhong Shen, Zilin Gao, Xiang Gao, Dan Cui

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Aizhong ShenCollege of Business Administration, Chaohu University, Hefei, 238000, Anhui Province, People's Republic of China.
Zilin GaoSchool of Computer Science and Engineering, Chongqing Three Gorges University, Chongqing, 404120, People's Republic of China.
Xiang GaoFaculty of Professional Finance and Accountancy, Shanghai Business School, Shanghai, 200235, People's Republic of China.
Dan CuiSchool of Management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai, 201620, People's Republic of China. 03190006@sues.edu.cn.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

As a type of zero-determinant strategies, the extortion strategy was found to be an evolutionarily stable strategy in structural groups. However, instead of complex networks structure, this paper focus on a multi-group game in hypernetworks, using the framework of a gift giving game driven by replicator-like dynamics. We find that the extortion is evolutionarily stable in the hypernetwork structure. The extortion game in hypernetworks can promote the emergence of the cooperative behavior compared to the traditional dual-strategy game and the extortion game in complex networks. The results show that the cooperation behavior attracts most of the groups for the smaller benefit value. With the increase of benefit value, cooperators turn into defectors and extortioners, but cooperation behavior still survives in hypernetworks under extreme conditions. Moreover, small-scale groups are more conducive to cooperation.

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionGame TheoryCooperative Behavior

Identifiers

PMID36471096
PMCPMC9723122

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.