Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36439065›Full record

ArticleOpen mind : discoveries in cognitive science2022

Social Prevalence Is Rationally Integrated in Belief Updating.

Evan Orticio, Louis Martí, Celeste Kidd

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Evan OrticioDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0572-6620
Louis MartíDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley.
Celeste KiddDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3167-1216

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

People rely on social information to inform their beliefs. We ask whether and to what degree the perceived prevalence of a belief influences belief adoption. We present the results of two experiments that show how increases in a person's estimated prevalence of a belief led to increased endorsement of said belief. Belief endorsement rose when impressions of the belief's prevalence were increased and when initial beliefs were uncertain, as predicted by a Bayesian cue integration framework. Thus, people weigh social information rationally. An implication of these results is that social engagement metrics that prompt inflated prevalence estimates in users risk increasing the believability and adoption of viral misinformation posts.

Indexed as

belief changebelief prevalencecue integrationmisinformation

Identifiers

PMID36439065
PMCPMC9692052

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.