ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2022
Research on Evolutionary Game of Water Environment Governance Behavior from the Perspective of Public Participation.
Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Article
- Research on talent cultivation for rural revitalization based on three-party evolutionary game.PloS one · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
As an informal environmental regulation, public participation plays a vital role in the multi-governance environmental system. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs the game models of government enterprise, public enterprise and government public enterprise, and analyzes the impact of different intensity of government behavior and public participation on enterprise behavior strategies. The results show that: (1) In the two-party evolutionary game, the behavior of each stakeholder is related to its costs and benefits. Still, effective public participation allows the enterprise to choose legal discharge, even if the benefits of legal discharge are smaller than illegal discharge. (2) In the three-party evolutionary game, the steady-state conditions of government and the public are the same as those in two-party evolutionary game models. However, the decision-making behavior of enterprises also needed to consider the impact of public whistle-blowing on their reputation and image. (3) With the increase of the government's ecological protection publicity, subsidies, fines, public concern, and whistle-blowing, the evolution speed of the enterprise towards legal discharge is faster.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.