Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36355234›Full record

ArticleHealth economics review2022

Competition and quality of care under regulated fees: evidence from Ghana.

Adolf Kwadzo Dzampe, Shingo Takahashi

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health economics review, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

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3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Adolf Kwadzo DzampeJapan Development Service (JDS) PhD Fellow, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University, 1-5-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima, Hiroshima, 739-8529, Japan. forster@iuj.ac.jp.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3613-5057
Shingo TakahashiAssociate Professor, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University, 1-5-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima, Hiroshima, 739-8529, Japan.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundHow competition affects the quality of care is still not well understood empirically because of limited and mixed results. This study examined whether competition leads to higher or lower quality health outcomes in Ghana.

methodsWe used administrative claims data of hypertension patients for 2017 - 2019 (36 months), and an instrumental variable method to examine the effect of competition, measured as an increase in district doctor-to-population ratio on hospital-level ambulatory care sensitive condition hospitalization and in-hospital death rates.

resultsOverall, we found that an increase in doctor density improves the quality of care for hypertension patients in Ghana. That is, when there are more doctors, fewer patients are hospitalized, and the risk of in-hospital deaths decreases. This result is robust to analyses at the individual and district population levels for ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizations rate.

conclusionsOur findings suggest that in the presence of physician-induced demand, competition can lead to improvement in the quality of care, possibly through improved access to healthcare and increased physician time and contact per patient. Future health policies need to consider possible welfare benefits of induced medical services and training more doctors.

Indexed as

Ambulatory care sensitive hospitalizationCompetitionDoctor-to-population ratioGhanaHypertensionPhysician-induced demandQuality of care

Identifiers

PMID36355234
PMCPMC9647994

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.