Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36348153›Full record

ArticlePharmacoEconomics2022

Getting the Price Right: Lessons for Medicare Price Negotiation from Peer Countries.

Leah Z Rand, Aaron S Kesselheim

Abstract read
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In one paragraph

Article in PharmacoEconomics, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Leah Z RandThe Program on Regulation, Therapeutics, and Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital, 1620 Tremont St., Suite 3030, Boston, MA, 02120, USA. lzrand@bwh.harvard.edu.ORCID 0000-0003-3262-1584
Aaron S KesselheimThe Program on Regulation, Therapeutics, and Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital, 1620 Tremont St., Suite 3030, Boston, MA, 02120, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The USA pays more for brand-name prescription drugs than any other country and new legislation from August 2022 gives Medicare the authority to directly negotiate certain drug prices with manufacturers starting in 2026-something the federal insurer had been prohibited from doing for its prior history. As the USA prepares for negotiations, we therefore surveyed how comparable industrialized countries use statutory requirements and procedures to negotiate brand-name drug prices. Guidance documents, regulations, government and academic publications were reviewed to identify the process of negotiating drug prices in peer countries that have been cited as potential examples for US payment reform: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK. Processes for arriving at a final price for a drug generally fall under three approaches: statutory rebates, setting a maximum price, and arbitration between national (public) insurers and manufacturers. Each approach to price negotiation could be adopted by Medicare and reduce spending even if Medicare does not adopt an exclusionary or closed formulary. Much remains to be determined about how the new price negotiation authority in the USA will be implemented, and policymakers can learn from comparator countries' statutory and regulatory strategies for price negotiation.

Indexed as

National Health ProgramsNegotiatingAgedAustraliaGermanyHumansInsurance Carriers

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.