Evidence map›Paper›PMID 36329176›Full record

ArticleCommunications biology2022

The complexity of the stream of consciousness.

Peter Coppola, Judith Allanson, Lorina Naci, Ram Adapa, Paola Finoia, Guy B Williams, John D Pickard, Adrian M Owen, David K Menon, Emmanuel A Stamatakis

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Communications biology, 2022. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Guideline
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. The volume and structural covariance network of thalamic nuclei in patients with Wilson's disease: an investigation of the association with neurological impairment.Neurological sciences : official journal of the Italian Neurological Society and of the Italian Society of Clinical Neurophysiology · 2024
    Article
  11. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Peter CoppolaDivision of Anaesthesia, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-8658-7409
Judith AllansonDepartment of Clinical Neurosciences, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.
Lorina NaciTrinity College Institute of Neuroscience, School of Psychology, Lloyd Building, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.ORCID 0000-0001-9630-3978
Ram AdapaDivision of Anaesthesia, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-9845-8532
Paola FinoiaDivision of Anaesthesia, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.
Guy B WilliamsDepartment of Clinical Neurosciences, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-5223-6654
John D PickardDepartment of Clinical Neurosciences, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-5762-6667
Adrian M OwenThe Brain and Mind Institute, Western Interdisciplinary Research Building, N6A 5B7 University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada.
David K MenonDivision of Anaesthesia, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-3228-9692
Emmanuel A StamatakisDivision of Anaesthesia, School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge, Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge, UK. eas46@cam.ac.uk.ORCID 0000-0001-6955-9601

Funding

Medical Research Council MR/M009041/1Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Typical consciousness can be defined as an individual-specific stream of experiences. Modern consciousness research on dynamic functional connectivity uses clustering techniques to create common bases on which to compare different individuals. We propose an alternative approach by combining modern theories of consciousness and insights arising from phenomenology and dynamical systems theory. This approach enables a representation of an individual's connectivity dynamics in an intrinsically-defined, individual-specific landscape. Given the wealth of evidence relating functional connectivity to experiential states, we assume this landscape is a proxy measure of an individual's stream of consciousness. By investigating the properties of this landscape in individuals in different states of consciousness, we show that consciousness is associated with short term transitions that are less predictable, quicker, but, on average, more constant. We also show that temporally-specific connectivity states are less easily describable by network patterns that are distant in time, suggesting a richer space of possible states. We show that the cortex, cerebellum and subcortex all display consciousness-relevant dynamics and discuss the implication of our results in forming a point of contact between dynamical systems interpretations and phenomenology.

Indexed as

BrainConsciousnessCerebral CortexHumans

Identifiers

PMID36329176
PMCPMC9633704

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.