ArticleAmbio2023
Regulation, the hybrid market, and species conservation: The case of conservation banking in California.
Article in Ambio, 2023. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
- Five rules for scientifically credible nature markets.Nature ecology & evolution · 2026Review
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Conservation Banking in California is a long-established offset program. Banks are hybrid instruments that hover between market autonomy and regulatory oversight. Challenges that may affect outcomes of the program include aligning regulation with the scales and objectives of the hybrid market and conservation and interaction with other compensation instruments. I use an analytical framework combining social-ecological fit (does the regulation fit the spatial, functional, and temporal scales of the market or conservation?) and instrument interaction (are compensation instruments redundant, synergetic, etc.?) to analyze the institutional framework of the conservation banking program. Results show that the program fails to reflect the hybrid market or species conservation objectives, creating a social-ecological mismatch. The institutional framework disincentivizes banking, while its contribution in conserving species cannot be measured. Competing and redundant instruments can lead to weaker compensation. The program needs equal standards that reflect conservation objectives for all compensation instruments. Findings on fit can be useful for other banking programs, and considerations on instrument interaction could improve offsets anywhere.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.